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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
          
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4114 
 ___________ 
 
 FELIX ANTONIO BLANCO MARTE, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
        Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A043-848-362) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2011 
 
 Before:  BARRY, JORDAN AND GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 15, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Felix Antonio Blanco Marte, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to 
the United States in 1992, as a lawful permanent resident.  In August 2009, Blanco Marte 
2 
 
was sentenced in New Jersey state court for two separate stalking convictions.1
 The IJ found that Blanco Marte was statutorily ineligible for cancellation because 
his convictions constituted aggravated felonies.  In the alternative, the IJ found that even 
  See 
N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:12-10(b), (c), (d).  The Government later charged Blanco Marte with 
being removable as an alien who has been convicted of two moral turpitude crimes not 
arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.  See Immigration and Nationality 
Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)].  He conceded the charge 
and applied for cancellation of removal pursuant to INA § 240A [8 U.S.C. §1229b].  
Under that provision, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, cancel the removal of 
an alien who (1) has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than five 
years, (2) has continuously resided in the United States in any status for seven years, and 
(3) has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.  INA § 240A(a).  Importantly, the 
alien must also establish that he warrants relief as a matter of discretion.  See Matter of 
C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998) (noting that the IJ must “balance the adverse 
factors evidencing the alien’s undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and 
humane considerations presented in his (or her) behalf to determine whether the granting 
of . . . relief appears in the best interest of this country.” (internal quotations omitted)).    
                                                 
1 In November 2007, Blanco Marte pleaded guilty in New Jersey state court to fourth-
degree stalking.  See N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-10(b).  He was sentenced to probation.  Blanco 
Marte continued to engage in similar behavior, however, and pleaded guilty in June 2009 
to stalking the same victim in violation of an existing court order prohibiting the 
behavior, a third-degree offense.  See N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:12-10(c) & (d).  In August 2009, he 
was sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment for the initial offense, and to 3 years of 
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if Blanco Marte was statutorily eligible for cancellation, the “significant negative factors 
militate against a favorable exercise of discretion in this case.”  Those factors included 
Blanco Marte’s two stalking convictions, an additional conviction and pending charge for 
“Driving Under the Influence,” his lack of compassion for the stalking victim, and his 
failure to seek counseling to address issues of “anger management and alcohol.”  Blanco 
Marte appealed, arguing that the IJ erred in denying his application for cancellation of 
removal by “focus[ing] on [a] marginal issue” and by applying “an incorrect legal 
standard.”  He also contended that the IJ abused her discretion by not granting a 
continuance so he could pursue post-conviction relief.  The Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed the appeal, agreeing that Blanco Marte was not eligible for 
cancellation of removal and that, in any event, the IJ correctly denied cancellation as a 
matter of discretion.  In particular, the BIA noted that the IJ had properly balanced 
Blanco Marte’s “length of residence, employment history, family ties, and potential 
hardship in the Dominican Republic . . . against his lack of clear-cut rehabilitation and the 
repeated criminal actions.”  The Board noted that Blanco Marte had not asked the IJ for a 
continuance, and rejected his request for a stay of his appeal while he pursued collateral 
relief in the New Jersey courts.  Blanco Marte filed a timely petition for review.   
 The Government argues that we lack jurisdiction to hear Blanco Marte’s claims 
because he is a criminal alien who seeks review of an order denying cancellation of 
removal in the exercise of discretion.  We generally do not have jurisdiction to review 
                                                                                                                                                             
imprisonment for the subsequent offense, to be served concurrently. 
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final orders of removal against aliens, like Blanco Marte, who are deemed removable 
because they were convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude.  See INA 
§ 242(a)(2)(C) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)] (precluding jurisdiction where alien is 
removable pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)).   In addition, we lack jurisdiction to review 
purely discretionary decisions, see INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)], 
such as the “manner in which the BIA balanced the various positive and negative factors 
which typically inform the exercise of its discretion under” INA § 240A.  Cruz-Camey v. 
Gonzales, 504 F.3d 28, 29 (1st Cir. 2007).  Despite these jurisdiction-stripping 
provisions, we may review “constitutional claims and questions of law presented in 
petitions for review of final removal orders.”  Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 
358 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing INA § 242(a)(2)(D) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)]).   
 In his petition for review, Blanco Marte suggests that he qualifies for cancellation 
of removal because he was not convicted of an aggravated felony.    Whether Blanco 
Marte’s stalking convictions qualify as an aggravated felony is a legal question which we 
have jurisdiction to review.  See Jeune v. Att’y Gen., 476 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Even if such a challenge was successful, however, we lack jurisdiction to review the 
alternative determination that Blanco Marte did not deserve cancellation of removal as an 
exercise of discretion.  See Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Furthermore, although we may consider whether the Board, in exercising its 
discretion, violated a rule of law or a provision of the Constitution, Blanco Marte has not 
raised any such allegations.  See Chen v. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 
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2006) (holding that a petition raises a question of law when it alleges a “fact-finding 
which is flawed by an error of law” or an “abuse of discretion” that is “based on a legally 
erroneous standard”).   
 Blanco Marte also claims that he “received an unfair hearing and was deprived of 
his due process right[]s pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the [C]onstitution because of 
the [IJ’s] decision to deny the motion for a continuance.”  The Board properly concluded, 
however, that Blanco Marte never requested a continuance in Immigration Court.  The 
BIA also denied Blanco Marte’s request to stay his appeal “while a New Jersey court 
considers vacating his convictions,”finding that he failed to demonstrate good cause.  To 
the extent that we have jurisdiction to review this determination, see Ogunfuye v. Holder, 
610 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that criminal alien’s argument that “the IJ 
abused its discretion by not granting her a continuance does not present a constitutional 
claim or issue of law that this court has jurisdiction to consider.”), we conclude that the 
Board did not abuse its discretion.  See Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (holding that the pendency of post-conviction motion does not negate the 
finality of convictions for immigration removal purposes).   
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in 
part and deny the petition for review in part.  Blanco Marte’s motion for appointment of 
counsel is denied. 
